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I. INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970's the highest courts of several western de-
mocracies handed down constitutional decisions concerning legal
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regulation of abortion. Roe v. Wade,1 decided by the United
States Supreme Court in 1973, was the first of these decisions.
The foreign cases were decided between 1974 and 1978 (four of
them in 1975). These included decisions by the Supreme Court
of Canada, the Constitutional Court of Austria, the Constitu-
tional Council of France, the Constitutional Court of Italy, and
the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany;2 subse-
quently, the European Commission on Human Rights sustained
the result in the West German case.'
The grounds on which constitutional challenges were made
can be divided into two groups. In Austria, Italy, France, and
Germany, petitioners challenged liberalized abortion statutes en-
acted in the early 1970's, claiming that under constitutional
guarantees of life, liberty, or human dignity, rights of unborn
children were being infringed. On the other hand, in the United
States, Canada, and under the European Convention of Human
Rights, petitioners challenged stringent abortion policies, claim-
ing that such policies invaded a pregnant woman's right to
privacy.
All jurisdictions sustained their abortion statutes except the
United States and West Germany. In an extraordinary assertion
of judicial power the United States Supreme Court voided strin-
gent abortion statutes of various states. In West Germany, the
Federal Constitutional Court moved in an opposite philosophical
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2. Morgentaler v. The Queen, 53 D.L.R.3d 161 (Can. 1975); Judgment of Oct. 11,
1974, Verfassungsgerichtshof, Aus., [1974] Erkldungen des Verfassungsgerichtshofis 221,
reprinted in M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 615 (1979)
(translation); Judgment of Jan. 15, 1975, Conseil constitutionel, Fr., 1975 D.S. Jur. 529,
reprinted in M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, supra, at 577 (translation); Judgment of Feb.
18, 1975, Corte costituzionale, Italy, 43 Raccolta ufficiale delle sentenze e ordinanze delle
Corte costituzionale [Rac. uff. corte cost.] 201, 98 Foro It. 1 515, reprinted in M. CAPPEL-
LETMI & W. COHEN, supra, at 612 (translation); Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht [BVerfG], W. Ger., 39 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 1, reprinted in
M. CAPPELLETTI & W. COHEN, supra, at 586 (translation). For a detailed discussion of the
French, Austrian, Italian, and German cases, see M. Nijsten, Constitutional Law and
Practice: A Comparative European-American Study (1985) (doctoral thesis, Department
of Law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy).
3. Brfggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1976 Y.B. Eua CONy.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 382 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights). In their appeal to the commis-
sion, the applicants argued that the German decision abridged their right to privacy
under the European convention. The commission accepted the application but ultimately
sustained the result of the German Court's decision. It reasoned that the right to individ-
ual privacy is not absolute and is subject to society's concern for fetal life. In reaching
this conclusion, it noted that all countries belonging to the Convention had enacted some
form of abortion regulation.
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direction by nullifying a recently enacted national abortion stat-
ute less rigorous than the previous law. In America, Wade gener-
ated a series of cases markedly different from cases under Ger-
man constitutional policy.4 The extended opinions of the
American and German courts, and their contrasting grounds for
decision, render them fitting candidates for this comparative
analysis of abortion jurisprudence.
Therefore, this article focuses primarily on American and
German abortion jurisprudence with an occasional glimpse,
where appropriate, at constitutional cases in other jurisdictions.
However, this article is not a simple comparison of legal doc-
trine. As the title suggests, this article considers abortion cases
as examples of judicial endeavors to reconcile values of liberty
and community in constitutional law. Constitutional republics
from Athens to the United States have sought to preserve values
of liberty and community in creative tension with one another
on the assumption that both are necessary in a properly ordered
constitutional polity. The abortion issue illustrates the tension
between liberty and community more clearly than any other cat-
egory of contemporary constitutional adjudication. This is not
surprising when one considers that the very definition of life and
the human community enters into these cases, a definition pro-
foundly affected by developments in biomedical technology and
by deep-seated changes in social attitudes.5
This paper unfolds in four stages. It first reviews the mean-
ing of liberty as defined by the United States and West Ger-
many. The paper then examines American cases from Wade
through the recent round of decisions handed down in 1983,
with a specific focus on the tension between liberty and commu-
nity. The analysis then turns to the German abortion case of
1975, drawing attention to those features of the case varying
with American jurisprudence. Finally, the paper seeks to explain
the differences in result between the German and American de-
cisions and, by reverting to themes of liberty and community, to
4. See Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
5. See Meulders-Klein, The Right Over One's Own Body: Its Scope and Limits in
Comparative Law, 6 B.C. INT'L & CoM. L. REv. 29 (1983).
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demonstrate the fertility of a comparative approach to constitu-
tional law.6
II. THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN AMERICAN AND WEST GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Fourteenth Amendment Liberty
Speaking for the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska,7 Mr. Justice
McReynolds uttered the classic statement of the meaning of
substantive due process liberty. He remarked that due process
liberty, substantively conceived,
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.8
Justices have repeatedly quoted portions of McReynolds' state-
ment to capture the essence of the liberty protected by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.9
Three distinguishing marks identify the character of these
rights. The first is their social nature: persons usually "worship
God" in communion with co-believers; they embrace "home and
children" for the sake of a community larger than themselves;
they obtain "useful knowledge" to advance confraternity; they
practice "common occupations of life" in company with their
confreres; and they exercise the "right to contract" to fulfill a
6. For other articles comparing the American and West German abortion cases, see
Benda, The Impact of Constitutional Law on the Protection of Unborn Human Life:
Some Comparative Remarks, 6 HuM. RTs. 223 (1977); Gerstein & Lowry, Abortion, Ab-
stract Norms, and Social Control: The Decision of the West German Federal Constitu-
tional Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 849 (1976); Glenn, The Constitutional Validity of Abortion
Legislation: A Comparative Note, 21 McGiL L.J. 673 (1975); Gorby & Jonas, West Ger-
man Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROc. 551
(1976); Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and West Germany, 25 Am.
J. CoMP. L. 255 (1977).
7. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
8. Id. at 399.
9. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 485 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 722 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 572 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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binding commitment. These are, of course, personal rights often
exercised with cunning and self-interest but nevertheless
anchored in family, home, church, school, guild, craft, union,
neighborhood, and other forms of fellowship. They are rights of
men and women exercised in partnership with other men and
women. They speak, fundamentally, to values of sociality and
solidarity.
The second distinguishing mark of the liberty protected by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments is its pedigree. This liberty
extends to "privileges long recognized at common law."' 10 It is
not confined to Blackstone's teachings or even to privileges set
out in the Bill of Rights. Larger than positive law, due process
liberty vindicates, in John Marshall Harlan's words, "the basic
values that underlie our society.""' These values are defined by
their fundamentality. They embrace principles of justice at the
core of American civil and political institutions. These values are
worthy of protection because of public and private virtues we, as
a community of free persons, wish to foster. Due process liberty
relates to privileges, rights, and values embedded in the warp
and woof of our national being.
The final mark of due process liberty is that it is subject to
regulation in the public interest. Such liberty "is not un-
restricted license to act according to one's own will."' 2 The Con-
stitution endorses "orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"' 3
or, as Justice Cardozo remarked in Palko v. Connecticut, only
those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'14 Regu-
lation of due process liberty strives for "the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of
organized society.' 5 Of course, these demands can get out of
hand, tainting regulation with overbreadth or arbitrariness inju-
rious to basic liberties. Nevertheless, as the Meyer Court recog-
nized, "the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally."'6 In short, liberty is balanced against sociality and
10. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
12. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890).
13. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
14. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
15. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
16. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added).
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bound by long-held and deep-seated community views on pri-
vate and public morality.17
One of this article's arguments is that the creative tension
between liberty and sociality in constitutional law existed in the
Supreme Court's fourteenth amendment jurisprudence at least
down to Griswold v. Connecticut.'8 However, in the aftermath of
Griswold stretching from Eisenstadt v. Baird 9 to the abortion
cases of 1983,20 the Court's emphasis slowly began to change,
with the tension between liberty and sociality dissolving into a
new principle that exalted liberty at the expense of sociality or
community. 21
The concept of liberty emerging from the abortion and birth
control cases has often been defined as personal autonomy, a
value rooted in contemporary notions of personhood and human
dignity.22 We shall discover that these concepts mean different
things in German and American constitutional thought. Finally,
in revisiting the American abortion cases, we shall find that the
path leading to emergence of the new liberty is strewn with un-
17. Due process liberty was also allowed to secure its essential meaning beneath an
alluvium of vital institutional constraints. Justice Harlan recognized the importance of
these constraints when he counseled a "wise appreciation of the great roles that the doc-
trines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving
American freedoms." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ash-
croft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983).-
21. This thesis is developed at much greater length in my forthcoming book: D.
KOMMERS, THE QUEST FOR PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
22. For ardent defenses of liberty as autonomy, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrU-
TIONAL LAW § 15 (1978); Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in
the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 445 (1983). In addition, a large number of
contemporary constitutional theorists have mounted sturdy arguments in support of the
priority of individual rights over sociality. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). For a general discussion of Perry and a number of
other contemporary rights theorists, see Wiseman, The New Supreme Court Commenta-
tors: The Principled, the Political and the Philosophical, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 315
(1983). The new theorists often argue that the state has no significant role to play in
fostering public virtue. Rooted in libertarian theory harkening back to John Stuart Mill,
this position asserts that the state may not properly take sides on moral questions, par-
ticularly those affecting private behavior, or those which advance any particular concep-
tion of the good. For powerful critiques of this position, see A. MACINTRYE, AFTER VIRTUE
(1981); M. SANDEL, THE Limwrs OF LIBERALISM (1982).
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certainty, raising serious questions even today about the doctri-
nal stability of the right of autonomy.
B. Liberty in German Constitutional Law
The German Constitution explicitly celebrates values of
human dignity and personhood implicit in the concept of four-
teenth amendment "liberty" as construed by the United States
Supreme Court. Article 1 of the Federal Republic's Basic Law
proclaims: "The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and
protect it is the duty of all state authority. '23 The Federal Con-
stitutional Court has repeatedly described the principle of
human dignity as the "core of the Constitution's value system"24
or, alternatively, as the "highest legal value"2 5 of the Basic Law.
Article 1, as a consequence, permeates the substance and spirit
of all other provisions of the German Bill of Rights.
Article 1 is almost always read in conjunction with article 2,
the constitutional provision most relevant to the abortion issue.
Paragraph 2 of article 2 provides: "Everyone has the right to life
and to inviolability of his person."2 6 Any right to life of the un-
born would clearly emerge from this declaration. On the other
hand, any countervailing right of a pregnant woman to abort her
fetus would just as clearly emerge from article 2, paragraph 1:
"Everyone has the right to the free development of his personal-
ity insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend
against the constitutional order or the moral code. 2 7 The per-
sonality right of paragraph 1 has been construed to protect per-
sonal autonomy,28 a close equivalent to the privacy right pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The German Constitution also explicitly delineates commu-
nitarian restraints imposed on the exercise of liberty. As just
23. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 1, para. 1 (W. Ger.). An English translation may be found
in W. ANDREWS, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (3d ed. 1968).
24. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG 1, 43; see also
Judgment of May 29, 1973, BVerfG, W. Ger., 35 BVerfG 79, 135.
25. See Judgment of June 21, 1977, BVerfG, W. Ger., 45 BVerfG 187, 227; Judg-
ment of Feb. 24, 1971, BVerfG, W. Ger., 30 BVerfG 173, 193; Judgment of July 16, 1969,
BVerfG, W. Ger., 27 BVerfG 6; Judgment of Dec. 20, 1960, BVerfG, W. Ger., 12 BVerfG
45, 53.
26. GG art. 2, para. 2 (W. Ger.).
27. GG art. 2, para. 1 (W. Ger.).
28. See K. DOEHRING, DAs STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 284-92
(3d ed. 1984); B. SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU & F. KLEIN, KOMmENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 151-69 (5th ed. 1980).
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noted, in article 2 the "rights of others," the "constitutional or-
der," and the "moral code" constrain free development of per-
sonality. These concepts of "moral code" and "constitutional or-
der" require some explanation. In German abortion
jurisprudence the moral code embodies society's deepest beliefs
about family and sex. A theory of family is actually incorporated
into "constitutional order" as defined by article 6 of the Basic
Law. Paragraph 1 of article 6 states: "Marriage and family enjoy
special protection by the state. '29 According to the Federal Con-
stitutional Court, article 6 "views marriage and family as the
germ-cell of any human community, whose significance cannot
be compared with any human bond."30 Moreover, the Basic Law
envisions the family primarily as a child-raising institution.31
The family symbolizes a fundamental commitment to children
and thus to the future. Constitutional cases decided under arti-
cle 6 speak repeatedly of marriage as a commitment.3 2 The cases
also point out that under the Basic Law, family policy gener-
ally-especially that reflected in divorce and alimony legisla-
tion-must be applied with the child in mind and in a way that
will not diminish the marriage institution.3
The term "constitutional order" embraces the concept of
Sozialstaat, loosely translated as "social welfare state." As con-
strued, the Sozialstaat principle, considered in tandem with
substantive value judgments under article 6, imposes an affirma-
tive duty on the state to establish an environment within which
the family can survive and flourish.34
Other provisions of the Bill of Rights similarly constrain
fundamental liberties. For example, freedom of expression, by
29. GG art. 6, para. 1 (W. Ger.).
30. Judgment of Jan. 17, 1957, BVerfG, W. Ger., 6 BVerfG 55, 71.
31. Article 6 of the Basic Law provides in paragraphs 2 and 3 that:
(2) The care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the par-
ents and a duty primarily incumbent on them. The state watches over the per-
formance of this duty.
(3) Separation of children from the family against the will of the persons
entitled to bring them up may take place only pursuant to a law, if those so
entitled fail in their duty or if the children are otherwise threatened with
neglect.
GG art. 6, paras. 2-3 (W. Ger.).
32. See, e.g., Judgment of June 15, 1971, BVerfG, W. Ger., 31 BVerfG 194; Judg-
ment of July 29, 1968, BVerfG, W. Ger., 24 BVerfG 119.
33. See Judgment of July 14, 1981, BVerfG, W. Ger., 57 BVerfG 361; Judgment of
Feb. 28, 1980, BVerfG, W. Ger., 53 BVerfG 224.
34. GG art. 6, para. 1 (W. Ger.).
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the terms of article 5, paragraph 2, is limited by "provisions of
law for the protection of youth" and by the "right to inviolabil-
ity of personal honor. ' 35 The German Constitution itself then,
sets forth a balance between individual rights and communitar-
ian values that in American constitutional law has been worked
out by constitutional interpretation. In fact, prior to the Ameri-
can abortion cases, an observer would have found a high degree
of convergence in the way American and German courts have
resolved the tension between liberty and community.
Yet, despite appeal to values of personhood and human dig-
nity, the two courts resolved the abortion issue in different ways.
The United States Supreme Court invoked these values to vindi-
cate the constitutional right of a woman to procure an abortion.
The Federal Constitutional Court appealed to the same values
to vindicate the right to life of the unborn. In the end, different
judicial results in the two nations owe less to differences in con-
stitutional language or text than to differences in the philosophi-
cal and social theories underlying the meaning of human liberty
as defined by the two tribunals.3 6 The purpose of this article is
to clarify differences in the two nations' constitutional doctrines
and to hazard an explanation for these differences.
III. THE AMERICAN ABORTION CASES: LIBERTY AS AUTONOMY
In the United States, abortion liberty has been the subject
of three major rounds of doctrinal elaboration: the first round
began in 1973 with the seminal cases of Roe v. Wade37 and Doe
v. Bolton;38 the second embraced a series of decisions stretching
from Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,39 decided in 1976, to
H.L. v. Matheson,40 decided in 1981; and the third embraced
three major decisions in 1983. Each round extended the right of
privacy to new levels of personal autonomy. Yet a close reading
of the later cases discloses stirrings of anxiety and even open
resistance to broad extension of the autonomy implied in the
original cases. Justices on both sides of the abortion dispute
35. GG art. 5, para. 2 (W. Ger.).
36. See infra notes 159-85 and accompanying text.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
39. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
40. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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seem aware of the conceptual distance the Court has traveled
since its classic definition of liberty in Meyer v. Nebraska.4'
A. The First Round: 1973
The first round cases, Wade and Bolton, need briefly to be
situated in the context of the principles and precedents that
gave them birth. The key precedent is Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.42 In nullifying a state statute proscribing use of contracep-
tives, Griswold sustained the right to marital privacy. It vindi-
cated a right rooted in the institution of marriage; it did not
uphold a purely personal right to use contraceptives. The insti-
tutional character of the right and its pedigree were charmingly
depicted by Justice Douglas:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as no-
ble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.43
Justice Goldberg rejected Justice Douglas' opinion concern-
ing the textual basis of the constitutional right to marital pri-
vacy, but nevertheless agreed that what was being protected
here, in light of prior authority, was the "traditional relation of
the family-a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire
civilization."'44 Marital privacy is thus a protected area of private
moral behavior. But Justice Goldberg did not view all private
moral behavior as protected by due process liberty. Justice
Goldberg asserted in his concurrence that the holding in Gris-
wold "in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of
sexual promiscuity or misconduct. ' 45 The essence of his remark,
drawing upon Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ull-
man,46 is that human sexuality is a potentially explosive force
the state may wish to channel into the institution of marriage.
41. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Id. at 486.
44. Id. at 496 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 498-99.
46. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Poe the plaintiffs sought a
declaration that a Connecticut statute prohibiting contraceptive use was unconstitu-
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Eisenstadt v. Baird,47 however, severed the right of privacy
from its institutional base in marriage. In sustaining the right of
unmarried persons to buy and receive contraceptives, the Court
effectively reinterpreted Griswold. Justice Brennan, writing for
the plurality, declared: "If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child. '48 This sentence is the foundation on which Wade
was built. But the foundation is weak for three reasons: first, the
case was decided on equal protection, not due process grounds;
second, the Court never said precisely what right it was vindicat-
ing; and third, the decision had less than majority support. Cer-
tainly, the Court was protecting an important aspect of personal
privacy. But how far would the right to personal privacy be car-
ried and what general principle would be invoked to explain the
full scope of the privacy right sustained in Eisenstadt?
The first round of abortion cases provides at best only par-
tial answers to these questions. In Wade, as in Griswold and Ei-
senstadt, the Court emphasized the substantive right of personal
privacy based on the fourteenth amendment concept of liberty.49
But the tug between liberty and sociality continued. On one
hand, the Court held this liberty was "broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy." 50 On the other hand, the Court refused to make the
right to personal privacy absolute. "The pregnant woman,"
wrote Justice Blackmun for the Court, "cannot be isolated in her
privacy." 51 Why? Because "[s]he carries an embryo and, later, a
fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing
young in the human uterus. ' 52 "The situation," he continued,
"therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy."53 Jus-
tional. The request was denied by a plurality of the Court for lack of justiciability. How-
ever, the Court felt chances were slim that the statute would actually be enforced. Jus-
tice Harlan reached the merits and would have stricken the law as an unconstitutional
encroachment upon the right to family privacy. Id. at 551-52.
47. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
48. Id. at 453.
49. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-56.
50. Id. at 153.
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tice Blackmun implied that abortion, unlike marital intimacy, is
subject to regulation.
The Court then proceeded to define limits to state regula-
tory power over abortion. In so doing the justices relied heavily
on the current state of medical technology. They divided preg-
nancy into trimesters and laid down a special constitutional
standard for each. During the first trimester, .the state may not
interfere with a woman's decision to have an abortion. At this
stage, partially because of the simplicity of the relevant medical
procedures, the Court reasoned that government has no valid
reason for regulating the abortion decision.5 4 Only later in preg-
nancy would compelling state interests emerge to justify abor-
tion regulation. Accordingly, out of concern for maternal health,
the state may regulate abortion procedure but not the abortion
decision itself during the second trimester. Finally, during the
last trimester, when the fetus is capable of survival outside the
womb, the state may protect "potential life," even to the point
of banning abortion completely "except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother. ' 55 The Court's regula-
tory scheme hinges on its declaration that the fetus is not a per-
son within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.56 The tri-
mester logic of Wade is in stark contrast, as we shall see, to the
logic used in the German abortion case.
Another striking feature of Wade and Bolton substantially
at variance with German jurisprudence is the emphasis placed
on a physician's liberty to practice medicine, a liberty interwo-
ven with the rights of a pregnant woman. In setting forth the
first-trimester rule in Wade, the Court declared that "the at-
tending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to de-
termine without regulation by the State, that in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. '57 Bol-
ton shifted the emphasis even more decidedly away from a wo-
man's privacy right to a physician's liberty. In that case the
state had conditioned a doctor's decision to perform an abortion
upon approval of a hospital committee and written concurrence
of two other physicians. Such certification procedures, the Bol-
54. Id, at 163.
55. Id. at 164-65.
56. Id. at 157-58.
57. Id. at 163.
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ton Court held, unduly burdened the physician's personal lib-
erty interest in practicing medicine."8
The physician's liberty in Bolton curiously included not
only making the "best clinical judgment that an abortion is nec-
essary,' 59 but also rendering a medical judgment "exercised in
the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, famil-
ial and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the pa-
tient."60 This language evokes an image of the omniscient physi-
cian, the competent all-around counselor skilled in a range of
problems having little to do with clinical judgment as such. Bol-
ton's language also evokes an image of the trusty physician, a
caring Dr. Welby moved by compassion, unmotivated by finan-
cial gain, and devoted, in the Court's words, to the "physical and
mental welfare, the woes, the emotions, and the concern of his
female patients."6 '
This focus on the physician's interest prompts one to ask
whether the privacy right vindicated in Wade and Bolton radi-
cally redefined "liberty" as that term was understood by the
Meyer Court in 1926. The creation of an abortion right need not
imply destruction of the social or communal character of the lib-
erty protected by the fourteenth amendment. Only with the sec-
ond round of cases did abortion liberty shade into something re-
sembling a right to personal autonomy.
B. The Second Round: 1976-81
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,62 decided in 1976, was
Wade's first major offspring. Danforth invalidated state statutes
conditioning freedom to have a first-trimester abortion on
spousal consent or on parental consent when the pregnant wo-
man is an unmarried minor. Rejecting the view of marriage as
two in one flesh and family as an integrated moral unit, the
Court maintained that abortion liberty is, in the end, a personal
right. "[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority,"
said the Court, "to give a third party an absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient
58. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 198-200.
59. Id. at 199.
60. Id. at 192.
61. Id. at 196.
62. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for
withholding the consent. '6 3
Danforth manifested once again the Court's continuing con-
cern for the liberty interest of the practicing physician. His dis-
cretion, in fact, reached beyond any limits that might have been
implied in the seminal cases. Now the state was forbidden to
determine the standard of care to be exercised by a physician
even when that standard required the physician to preserve the
life and health of a fetus. 4 Additionally, the state was barred
from determining a specific point in the gestation period as the
stage of viability or from proscribing specific medical techniques
for aborting a fetus, unless such regulations reasonably related
to the preservation and protection of maternal health.
5
If after these decisions there was any doubt that the Court
was vindicating the right to personal autonomy, whether of the
woman or the doctor, that doubt seemed to be resolved in Carey
v. Population Services International,66 a watershed decision be-
cause of the gloss it placed on abortion cases. In striking down a
New York law, Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the
Court, noted that any substantial limit on access to contracep-
tives, whether intended for adults or minors, married or unmar-
63. Id. at 74.
64. The statutory provision at issue in Danforth required any physician assisting in
an abortion to take all steps necessary to preserve fetal life. Failure to do so would have
subjected the physician to criminal penalties for manslaughter. The Court declared this
provision overbroad as it failed to distinguish between abortions performed before and
after the point of viability. The effect was to preclude abortions at all stages of preg-
nancy, and this the Court found impermissible. See id. at 82-83.
65. In Danforth the Court upheld a statutory definition of "viability" as "that stage
of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." Id. at 63. This defini-
tion, said the Court, was sufficiently flexible to comply with the requirements of Wade.
Moreover, it required a determination of viability to be made on a case-by-case basis.
See id. at 64-65.
As to the impermissibility of statutory limitations on a doctor's choice of abortion
techniques, see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). In Colautti the Court held
unconstitutional a portion of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act requiring the doctor
to use that technique "which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be
aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve
the life or health of the mother." Id. at 380 n.l. The Court found this section impermissi-
bly vague as it required "the physician to make a 'trade off' between the woman's health
and additional percentage points of fetal survival." Id. at 400.
66. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Carey involved a challenge to a New York statute prohibit-
ing distribution of contraceptives to anyone under the age of 16, prohibiting distribution
to persons over 16 except by a licensed pharmacist, and banning any contraceptive ad-
vertisement or display. The Court struck each of these provisions as impermissible re-
strictions on an individual's right to use contraceptives.
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ried, is invalid if such access is essential to exercise of the consti-
tutionally protected right of "individual autonomy in matters of
childbearing. '8 7 This was the first time the word "autonomy"
appeared in a plurality or majority opinion describing the so-
called childbearing liberty.68
Interestingly, five justices apparently thought the Court was
carrying the liberty principle too far in Carey. 9 Justice Stevens,
who concurred in the result, rejected the argument that a "mi-
nor has the constitutional right to put contraceptives to their
intended use, notwithstanding the combined objection of both
parents and the State. '70 Decided in light of the abortion cases,
Carey nevertheless appeared to reinterpret Wade by vindicating
the right of any person to control intimate personal decisions
regarding his or her own body, and by narrowing state regulation
except by the least restrictive means available and in the pres-
ence of a compelling state interest.71
The print in Carey had barely dried when suddenly, and
surprisingly, the Court appeared to rethink the basis of its abor-
tion jurisprudence. In two companion cases (the "Medicaid"
cases) decided in 1977 by six to three votes,72 the Court held
67. Id. at 687-88.
68. Since Carey, the Court has used the word autonomy in only one case on
childbearing or family liberties. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 442 (1981). Interest-
ingly, the Court speaks of "family autonomy," not "personal autonomy" in that case.
69. Justices White, Powell, and Stevens each filed separate concurring opinions
while Justices Rehnquist and Burger dissented. The concurring justices disagreed most
strongly on the question of contraceptive distribution to minors. Stevens, for instance,
said this: "[I] could not agree that the Constitution provides the same measure of protec-
tion to the minor's right to use contraceptives as to the pregnant female's right to abort."
Carey, 431 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring). Similarly, Powell expressed reservations
as to the Court's extension of fourteenth amendment liberties. "In my view," he said,
"the extraordinary protection the Court would give to all personal decisions in matters of
sex is neither required by the Constitution nor supported by our prior decisions." Id. at
703 (Powell, J., concurring). Rehnquist had an even more biting commentary:
If those responsible for these Amendments [the Civil War Amendments], by
feats of valor or efforts of draftsmanship, could have lived to know that their
efforts had enshrined in the Constitution the right of commercial vendors of
contraceptives to peddle them to unmarried minors through such means as
window displays and vending machines located in the men's room of truck
stops, notwithstanding the considered judgment of the New York Legislature
to the contrary, it is not difficult to imagine their reaction.
Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (a polite way of saying they would turn in their
graves).
70. Id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. For an exhaustive discussion of a person's right over his own body, see
Meulders-Klein, supra note 5.
72. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
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that federal Medical Assistance (Medicaid) legislation did not
compel states to fund nontherapeutic abortions. The teaching of
these cases is that a state may deny financial assistance to
women choosing abortion. The framework within which these
cases were decided could not disguise the significant shift in em-
phasis, if not doctrine. First, where the Wade Court had ruled
that the state had no compelling interest in potential life until
approximately the third trimester, the Court in the Medicaid
cases posited a "significant state interest" in protecting potential
life "throughout the course of the woman's pregnancy. '74 Sec-
ond, the Court applied a minimum rationality rather than a
compelling state interest test to the legislative classifications in-
volved.75 Finally, the Court held that in providing health bene-
fits to its citizens, the state may prefer childbirth over abortion,
but such an interest would not justify "unduly burdensome"
government interference with the woman's freedom of choice
until the third trimester of pregnancy. 76
The Medicaid cases clearly displayed the Court's uneasiness
with the manner in which sociality had been subordinated to lib-
erty in the abortion cases. This uneasiness manifested itself even
in Bellotti v. Baird,7 7 a 1979 case that struck down, with an
eight to one plurality, yet another parental consent statute. Over
the objection of four justices, Justice Powell undertook to in-
struct Massachusetts on how it might craft a constitutionally
valid parental consent statute. 7 The flaw in the voided statute
was the absolute veto power conferred on the parent or guardian
over the minor's decision to procure an abortion. Justice Powell
73. This doctrine was reaffirmed in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), where by
a five to four decision the Court sustained the validity of the Hyde Amendment, which
prohibited states from using federal funds to finance abortions "except where the life of
the mother would be endangered, or where the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest
which was promptly reported." Id. at 302 (quoting Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979)).
74. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
75. Id. The Court did not explicitly label Pennsylvania's justification rational basis.
It did, however, acknowledge the state's "unquestionable strong and legitimate interest
in encouraging normal childbirth." Id. at 445. As a second rationale, perhaps, the Court
noted that the state had "reasonable justification for excluding from Medicaid coverage a
particular medically unnecessary procedure-nontherapeutic abortions." Id. at 447 n.11
(Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
78. Id. at 642-44. Justice Stevens, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, con-
curred in the judgment but rejected Powell's proposed statute. In a parting footnote,
Stevens denounced Powell's "advisory opinion." Id. at 656 n.4.
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opined that an untainted statute would give the minor (particu-
larly one still living at home with her parents) the option of go-
ing to court to show that she is mature enough to make her deci-
sion independently or that the abortion would be in her best
interest.79 Under Powell's imaginary statute, if the minor is una-
ble to make at least one of the aforementioned showings, the
judge may withhold his consent, thus forcing her back into the
family's bosom.
In the course of his opinion, Justice Powell composed an
ode to the family. Many old cases vindicating family
rights-from the 1925 case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters0 to
the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoders8 -were resurrected and
cited with approval. Parental authority was viewed as basic to
individual liberty: 2
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental au-
thority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual lib-
erty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of
the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those sup-
portive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 3
Two years later, in line with this sentiment, the Court upheld
Utah's statute requiring a physician to "notify, if possible," the
parents or guardian of a minor upon whom an abortion was to
be performed. 4 Chief Justice Burger, speaking for four other
members of the Court, justified the law applying to immature
unemancipated minors as a legitimate means to enhance family
integrity.85
Clearly the Medicaid cases marked the beginning of a major
skirmish on the Court over the very meaning and application of
Wade. One could only guess whether in the third round of cases,
to be decided in 1983, the counteroffensive launched on behalf
of communal values would be extended to adult women as well
as to minors. Justices Powell, Burger, White, Stewart, and Rehn-
quist seemed poised to strike a somewhat different balance be-
79. Id. at 642-44.
80. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
81. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
82. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-39.
83. Id. at 638-39.
84. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
85. Id. at 411.
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tween liberty and sociality from the one approved in Danforth
and Carey.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, on the other
hand, seeking to fortify Danforth and Carey, unleashed in their
Medicaid dissents the full force of the personal autonomy argu-
ment.86 We learned from them, for the first time, that abortion
is only one of many methods of limiting family size. Justice
Brennan, in dissent, wrote: "'[A]bortion and childbirth, when
stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abor-
tion controversy, are simply two alternative medical methods of
dealing with pregnancy.' "187 Thus the state could not adopt the
view allowed by the majority that childbirth is morally superior
to abortion. In the dissenters' view, both deserve the same level
of constitutional protection.
What would the future hold? Would the communitarian
thrust of the late second round cases be pressed further as the
Court prepared to enter, in 1983, the third round of abortion
adjudication? Would the Court legitimate new and proliferating
regulations of adult abortions? Or would it confine its recent rul-
ings to cases involving immature minors? The Court seemed
free, in terms of its precedents, to travel down either road. The
one element of uncertainty was Justice O'Connor's recent ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court in the wake of Justice Stew-
art's resignation.
C. The Third Round: 1983
We need not tarry long on Simopoulos v. Virginia,88
Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,89 and City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,90 three cases de-
cided in June of 1983. They involved regulations imposed by the
city of Akron, Ohio and the states of Missouri and Virginia. In
these cases the Court upheld regulations requiring: (1) a pathol-
ogy report for each abortion performed;91 (2) parental consent or
approval of a juvenile court before an abortion could be per-
formed on a minor;92 and (3) the presence of a second physician
86. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 448-63 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 449 (quoting Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 n.3 (D. Conn. 1975)).
88. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
89. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
90. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
91. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 486-90.
92: Id. at 490-93. Although the Court sustained the consent provisions in Ashcroft,
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during abortions of viable fetuses.93 The second physician re-
quirement, incidentally, was justified as a reasonable means of
furthering a compelling state interest in protecting the lives of
viable fetuses, a decision consistent with the potential life theory
so strongly endorsed in the Medicaid cases.94
More interesting, for our purposes, are regulations struck
down by the Court. These included provisions requiring: (1) per-
formance of post first-trimester abortions only in a hospital;95
(2) parental notification and consent, or a court order, before
performance of abortions on unmarried minors under the age of
fifteen;96 (3) prior disclosure of available family planning ser-
vices, certain fetal characteristics, and certain hazards of abor-
tion;97 (4) a twenty-four hour waiting period between the time
the pregnant woman signs a consent form and the time the abor-
tion would be performed;98 and (5) disposal of fetal remains by
the attending physician in a "humane and sanitary manner." 99
On first impression these rulings marked a reversion to Danforth
and Carey logic, vindicating the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun
theory of autonomous self-determination. The law appeared to
be wholly barred from influencing a woman's choice. The rheto-
ric of community and language of sociality, so it appeared, had
again receded into the background.
Yet a closer reading of the third round cases prompts a
more cautious view. The conclusory tone of the majority opin-
it clearly specified that this type of statute must be narrowly drawn to conform with
judicial precedent, particularly Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The plurality opin-
ion of Bellotti provided that consent provisions must contain a judicial alternative to
parental approval. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44; see also Akron, 462 U.S. at 416. In Akron
the Court went further, setting limits on the type of judicial inquiry required. The trial
judge is not simply to act as a parental substitute with an absolute veto over a minor's
decision. Specifically, the judge must first determine whether the minor is mature
enough to make the decision herself, and then if not, whether an abortion would be in
her best interests. Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-40. The Akron ordinance at issue required
women under the age of 15 to obtain written consent of her parents or "an order from a
court having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed or induced." Id. The
Court found this unconstitutionally vague as it did not expressly require a case-by-case
inquiry into the minor's maturity. In contrast, the Missouri consent statute at issue in
Ashcroft directed the judge to grant a petition for majority in an appropriate case or to
find abortion in the best interests of the applicant. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 492.
93. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 482-86.
94. Id.
95. Akron, 462 U.S. at 431-39; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 481-82.
96. Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-42.
97. Id. at 442-49.
98. Id. at 449-51.
99. Id. at 451-52.
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ions may reflect frustration with the force and cogency of
O'Connor's dissenting opinions. 100 Joined by Justices White and
Rehnquist, she renewed the assault on the rationale and consti-
tutional foundation of Wade. The three justices argued that ma-
ternal health and potential life are compelling state interests
throughout pregnancy and that legislation restricting abortion
should be measured by an "unduly burdensome" standard.1' 1 If
the restriction is not unduly burdensome then minimum ration-
ality rather than strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of re-
view. 102 In their view, of course, none of the challenged regula-
tions to which the standard was applied constituted an "undue
burden" on the right to secure an abortion.
One regulation struck down in Akron required that women
after the first three months of pregnancy have their abortions
performed in hospitals. Just ten years earlier, in Wade, the
Court expressly sanctioned such a regulation.1 03 The Court in
Akron noted advances in medical technology since Wade and
ruled that because of these advances the health of pregnant
women in at least part of the second trimester would be safe-
guarded as easily in an abortion clinic as in a hospital. 0 4 By so
ruling, however, the Court bruised Wade's rationale. As Justice
O'Connor wrote:
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with
itself. As the medical risks of various abortion procedures de-
crease, the point at which the State may regulate for reasons of
maternal health is moved forward to actual childbirth. As med-
ical science becomes better able to provide for the separate ex-
istence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back
toward conception."' 05
Justice O'Connor's remark is compelling. Constitutional law is
too important to rest on the state of medical technology, for this
is not the way to establish a constitutional tradition marked by
coherence and continuity.10 6
100. Justice O'Connor wrote separately in all three decisions, dissenting in Akron
and Ashcroft and concurring in Simopoulos. All three opinions reflected her disagree-
ment with the trimester approach. She stated her argument in detail in Akron and re-
ferred back to that dissent in the subsequent two cases.
101. Akron, 462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 462.
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
104. Akron, 462 U.S. at 435-37.
105. Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
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Interestingly enough, the majority made no effort to address
her argument. Rather, its opinion was a mere incantation of pre-
cedent. "[T]he doctrine of stare decisis," wrote Justice Powell
for the majority, "while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a
constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a
society governed by the rule of law. '10 7 One notes in this state-
ment a sense of frustration perhaps shared by Justices Burger
and Stevens. Indeed, a close look at judicial thought over time
shows that there was far less consensus on the Akron Court than
on the Wade Court. The Court has not yet found the right bal-
ance between liberty and sociality. Perhaps comparative consti-
tutional law can provide guidance.
IV. THE WEST GERMAN DECISION: AUTONOMY SUBORDINATED
TO OTHER VALUES
A. Introduction: The Case and Its History
On June 18, 1974, West Germany's Federal Parliament en-
acted the Abortion Reform Act, which liberalized the previous
law.108 The new law, section 218a of the Criminal Code, insti-
tuted a time-phase rule (Fristenregelung) permitting termina-
tion of a pregnancy by a physician within the first twelve weeks
after conception with the pregnant woman's consent.10 9 Before
107. Akron, 462 U.S. at 419-20.
108. Law of June 18, 1974, 1974 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGB1 I] 1297, Fiinften
Gesetzes zur Reform des Strafrechts [5 StrRG]. For a brief description of abortion re-
form legislation in Germany, see Gerstein & Lowry, supra note 6, at 850; see also 0. LEE
& T. ROBERTSON, "MORAL ORDER" AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REFORM EFFORTS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY 225-31 (1973). Details of the parliamentary debate
may be found in the Federal Constitutional Court's own account of the legislative actions
surrounding passage of the Abortion Reform Act of 1974. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975,
BVerfG, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG 1, 6-19; see also Kommers, supra note 6.
109. Section 218 of the Abortion Reform Act of 1974, as translated in Gorby & Jo-
nas, supra note 6, at 611-12, reads as follows:
§ 218
Interruption of Pregnancy
(1) Anyone who interrupts a pregnancy after the 13th day following con-
ception shall be punished by incarceration up to three years or fined.
(2) The punishment shall be six months to five years if the actor
1. acts against the will of the pregnant woman, or
2. wantonly causes the danger of death or serious impairment
of health to the pregnant woman.
The court can set up a supervision authority. (§ 68, Par. 1, No. 2).
(3) If the pregnant woman commits the act, the punishment is incarcera-
tion up to one year or a fine.
(4) The attempt is punishable. The woman shall not be punished for an
attempt.
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performance of the abortion, however, the woman was legally re-
quired to seek advice from a physician or counseling agency con-
cerning available public and private assistance for pregnant
women, mothers, and children. 110 Any termination of pregnancy
performed more than three months after conception was exempt
from punishment only if it was performed in the presence of
medical or eugenic indications."1
As soon as the new law became effective, the Federal Con-
stitutional Court, pursuant to a motion by the State of Baden-
Wtirttemberg, issued a temporary order suspending operation of
the twelve-week time-phase rule unless termination of the preg-
nancy was warranted by medical, eugenic, or ethical indica-
tions.1 2 Meanwhile, 193 members of the Bundestag together
with governments of five German states petitioned the Federal
Constitutional Court for a review of section 218a, claiming that
it was incompatible with the constitution. The petition invoked
the Constitutional Court's abstract judicial review procedure
under which a state or one-third of the members of the Federal
Parliament may ask the court to rule on the validity of a state or
federal law concerning which they have constitutional doubts.1
This procedure sharply contrasts with the case or controversy
§ 218a
Freedom from Punishment for Interruption of
Pregnancy in the First Twelve Weeks
An interruption of pregnancy performed by a physician with the consent
of the pregnant woman is not punishable under § 218 if no more than twelve
weeks have elapsed since conception.
110. Id. at 612. Section 218(c) of the Abortion Reform Act reads:
(1) He who interrupts a pregnancy without the pregnant woman:
1. First having, on account of the question of the interruption
of her pregnancy, presented herself to a physician or to a
counseling center empowered for the purpose and there been
instructed about the public and private assistance available
for the pregnant women, mothers and children, especially
such assistance which facilitates the continuation of the
pregnancy and eases the condition of mother and child, and
2. having been counseled by a physician, shall be punished up
to one year incarceration or by a fine if the act is not punish-
able under § 218.
(2) The woman upon whom the operation is performed is not subject to
punishment under Paragraph one.
111. Id. at 611-12.
112. Judgment of June 21, 1974, BVerfG, W. Ger., 37 BVerfG 324.
113. Federal Constitutional Court Organization Act [Gesetz fiber das Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht] (BVerfGG) para. 13 (6), 1951 BGB1 I 105. See generally Rupp, Judicial
Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 A. J. CoMP. L. 29 (1960).
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requirement for the exercise of judicial power in the United
States. Eight months later, on February 25, 1975, the Constitu-
tional Court issued its memorable opinion in the abortion
case.
114
The Federal Constitutional Court approached its task, as
did the United States Supreme Court, recognizing the delicacy
and complexity of the problem before it. The court held: first,
the life developing in the mother's womb is an independent legal
interest protected by the constitution;1 5 second, the state is ob-
ligated to protect fetal life against infringement by the state and
others, including the mother; 6 third, the protection of fetal life,
in principle, takes precedence over the pregnant woman's right
to self-determination for the entire period of pregnancy;1 7
fourth, lawmakers are obligated to define abortion as a crime if
other measures are inadequate for protection of unborn life; 1 s
and finally, lawmakers may exempt termination of pregnancy
from punishment not only where medical, ethical, and eugenic
indications are present,"9 but also in situations where extraordi-
nary social burdens on the pregnant woman outweigh the state's
interest in preserving developing human life within the womb. 20
B. Unborn Life as a Constitutionally Protected Value
Crucial to the case is the court's conclusion that the right to
life clause of article 2 protects unborn life."12  The court
grounded its holding in biology as well as in the original history
of the West German Constitution. In recalling debates of the
parliamentary council (constitutional convention), the court
found that the right to life clause, drafted in light of the Nazi
regime's disrespect for life, was intended by a majority of the
114. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG 1.
115. Id. at 36-42.
116. Id. at 42-44.
117. Id. at 44-51.
118. Id. at 45-46.
119. Id. at 49-50. The phrase "medical, ethical or eugenic indications" is meant to
cover those situations where the pregnancy would either endanger the mother's life or
health, was the product of a crime such as incest or rape, or is likely to result in heredi-
tary illness or defect.
120. Id. at 48.
121. Id. at 37-41. As to the concepts of life and liberty in German constitutional law,
see supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
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framers to protect the unborn although some of its framers de-
nied that such protection was part of the original intent.122
As the argument proceeded, biological considerations
loomed large in the court's reckoning. "Life in the sense of the
developmental existence of a human individual," said the court,
"begins, according to established biological-psychological find-
ings, on the 14th day after conception."'123 The German tribunal
explicitly rejected what the American Court had accepted,
namely, the division of pregnancy into zones of interest. Fetal
development, said the court,
manifests no sharp demarcation. Rather, it is a unitary process
of development from the shaping of the being in the womb to
the emergence of consciousness after birth. The right to life is
guaranteed to everyone who "lives"; no distinction can be
made between individual stages of developing life before birth
or between prenatal and postnatal life.' '124
Thus "everyone" within the meaning of article 2 includes the
"unborn human being. ' 125
The constitutional courts of Canada, Austria, Italy, and
France were less inclined than the Federal Constitutional Court
to recognize the right to life of the unborn during early stages of
pregnancy.' 2 Nevertheless, they were more inclined than the
United States Supreme Court to recognize unborn life as a fun-
damental value deserving constitutional protection. Unlike the
German and American tribunals, however, each of these courts
showed a great deal of sensitivity toward legislative efforts to
resolve the conflict of values between the life of the unborn and
the liberty of the pregnant woman. In every case except Canada,
the challenged statutes decriminalized abortion when performed
by a physician with the pregnant woman's consent in the first
ten to twelve weeks of pregnancy. They banned abortions after
this period unless medical, eugenic, or ethical indications, prop-
erly certified, warranted a pregnancy's termination. In these
courts, this time-phase solution did not imply a policy of uncon-
cern or disrespect for unborn life in the first ten to twelve weeks.
Taking judicial notice of abortion as a social problem, the courts
122. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG 1, 38-41.
123. Id. at 37.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 2.
ABORTION CASES
upheld the time-phase approach as a permissible balance be-
tween the liberty of the woman and the right of government to
interfere on behalf of unborn life.
In contrast, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the
state had not only the right but also the duty to protect devel-
oping life in the womb.127 The court considered the human dig-
nity clause of article 1 in tandem with the right to life clause of
article 2.128 "Whenever human life exists," said the court, "it
merits human dignity." 129 Recall the language of article 1: "The
dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty
of all state authority.' 130 This duty is reinforced by paragraph 3
of article 1 which establishes constitutional rights "as directly
enforceable law" binding on all branches of government. 31 1 From
these provisions the court extracted a theory of rights distinctive
to German constitutionalism.
According to this theory, basic rights are not only defensive
or negative in the sense of protecting the individual against the
state; they also create an "objective order of values" that the
state must effectively vindicate or safeguard, even against third
parties. 132 The state's duty, moreover, is proportionate to the
rank of the right within the hierarchy of objective values. "The
higher the legal interest within the order of the values of the
Constitution," said the court, "the more seriously the state's ob-
ligation to furnish protection must be taken."' 3 The state's duty
is clear because "human life represents a supreme value within
the constitutional order.' 34
Therefore, in the court's opinion, developing life must be
protected because, as a general principle, the right to life takes
precedence over the woman's right to self-determination or, in
article 2 language, "the free development of her personality. '
Recall that under the Basic Law the right to personality, unlike
the right to life, is limited by the rights of others, the constitu-
tional order, and moral law. Thus, since "the nasciturus is an
independent human being entitled to the protection of the Con-
127. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG 1, 41.
128. Id. at 26-42.
129. Id. at 41.
130. GG art. 1, para. 1 (W. Ger.).
131. GG art. 1, para. 3 (W. Ger.).
132. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG 1, 41-42.
133. Id. at 42.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 42-43.
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stitution, termination of pregnancy has a social dimension which
makes it accessible to and in need of regulation by the state."'1 36
There can be no simple compromise-as in the French, Aus-
trian, and Italian cases-between the right to life and the right
to personality. Wade, of course, permits no balancing of rights at
all during the first six months of pregnancy because the woman's
right to self-determination is decisive.
This argument of principle, however, yielded to pragmatism.
The Constitutional Court was no more willing to make the right
to life absolute than was the Supreme Court to make the right of
privacy absolute. Even though the Basic Law provides for pro-
tection of fetal life over a woman's right to self-determination
during the entire course of pregnancy, the Constitutional Court
recognized that at certain points the two values clash. "In any
balancing process required, therefore," said the court, "both
constitutional values must be perceived in their relation to
human dignity as the benter of the Constitution's value sys-
tem.' 3 7 The implication is clear: respect for human dignity may
require a heavier weight than usual on the self-determination
side of the scale.
What then, is the obligation of the legal order under the
German constitution's objective value system? Here is the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court's answer:
The legal order may not constitute the woman's right of self-
determination as the sole guideline for its regulation. The State
must in principle proceed from a duty of bringing the preg-
nancy to term [and] therefore in principle consider its termina-
tion as wrong. The disapproval of the termination of pregnancy
must be clearly expressed in the legal order. The false impres-
sion must be avoided that termination of pregnancy involves
the same social preeminence as say a trip to the physician for
the purpose of healing an illness, or even that it involves a le-
gally irrelevant alternative to contraception. Moreover, the
State by postulating a legal vacuum cannot escape its responsi-
bility by refraining from any valuation and leaving the decision
to the individual's own responsibility." 8
And so we find that in West Germany's value-oriented con-
stitutional order, the state cannot be neutral. Law must identify
136. Id.
137. Id. at 43.
138. Id. at 44.
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abortion for what it is, namely, "an act of killing." 13 9 But this
identification does not mean that the state must safeguard pre-
natal life in the same manner as postnatal life. "The decisive
point is whether the totality of measures of civil or public
law-particularly social law or criminal law-in fact guarantees
a protection corresponding to the importance of the legal inter-
est to be safeguarded. ' 140 The court ruled that the new abortion
statute failed to satisfy this standard.
Recall that the statute legalized abortion during the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy if performed by a licensed physician
with the woman's consent, after consultation with a counseling
board or physician legally bound to inform her of the available
public and private assistance. Criminal penalties continued to
operate with respect to abortions performed after the twelve-
week period except in the presence of medical, eugenic, or ethi-
cal indications. Interestingly, all parliamentary parties em-
broiled in the abortion controversy acknowledged the state's
duty under the constitution to protect the fetus at all stages of
pregnancy.1 4 Abortion reform was not predicated on any theory
of personal autonomy. Legislators regarded the counseling provi-
sion of the law as a more effective means of protecting unborn
life than criminal sanctions.1 43 They adopted time-phase coun-
seling in the face of evidence that women were resorting increas-
ingly to illegal abortions. 4 Thus, the statute was not a ringing
affirmation of abortion liberty; it represented instead a cautious
parliamentary attempt to adjust legal order to an evolving social
reality.1 45 The same general view, incidentally, informed the
French and Italian statutes, except that they imposed the added
requirement of a one-week waiting period between authorization
and performance of an abortion.
C. Flaws in the Abortion Reform Act
The Federal Constitutional Court approached its analysis of
the Abortion Reform Act by underscoring legislative discretion
in determining the necessary measures for protection of the "le-
139. Id. at 46.
140. Id. at 46-47.
141. Id. at 51.
142. Id. at 84-85 (dissenting opinion).
143. Id. at 15-16.
144. Id. at 81-83 (dissenting opinion).
145. Id. at 28-29.
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gal interest" represented by developing life in the womb. The
Basic Law's command to protect that life is directed mainly to
Parliament, and so long as legislative measures are appropriate
for the protection of unborn life, the judiciary should not inter-
vene.'46 But the Abortion Reform Act fell far short of the Basic
Law's command.
What was wrong with the statute? First, it failed to express
disapproval of abortion. 147 The court found that the regulatory
scheme as a whole, undergirded by abortion funding through
state medical insurance programs, conveyed the impression that
abortion as well as childbirth was a normal procedure associated
with pregnancy. Second, the statute failed to distinguish be-
tween valid and invalid abortions, thus ignoring the normative
content of the constitutional command to protect life. 48 Third,
the counseling procedures were flawed because they failed to de-
ter abortion. 49 "Physicians, on the basis of their professional
training," said the court, "have neither the qualifications for
such counseling activities nor, generally, the time required for
individual counseling."'150 Additionally, the court noted that
counseling boards were required only to convey information, not
to dissuade women from procuring abortions.' 5 ' Finally, the stat-
ute was flawed because the physician who was required to in-
form the pregnant woman of available social assistance could
also perform the abortion. 52
In light of these statutory deficiencies, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court suspended operation of the time-phase counseling
rule pending adoption of a new statute consistent with the value
order of the Basic Law.153 However, the court did instruct par-
liament that it could allow a woman to procure an abortion for
reasons of extreme social hardship. Situations exist, said the
court, where "the right to life of the unborn may lead to a bur-
den on the woman which substantially exceeds the measure nor-
mally connected with pregnancy.' 54 Medical, eugenic, and ethi-
cal indications were found to constitute oppressive burdens that
146. Id. at 51.
147. Id. at 50-51.
148. Id. at 55-56.
149. Id. at 61-64.
150. Id. at 62.
151. Id. at 61-62.
152. Id. at 62-63.
153. Id. at 2-3.
154. Id. at 48-50.
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a pregnant woman could not reasonably be expected to
sustain.155
The court, in a legislative frame of mind, added a rule of
social necessity. Balancing of rights would be permissible in so-
cial "circumstances of extraordinary weight." 156 However, bal-
ancing suggests compromise, a golden mean. But that suggestion
is misleading. Here it would be possible for the legislator to
"balance" the unborn out of existence.1 57 "Esteem for prenatal
life conflicts with the right of the woman not to be forced be-
yond reasonable expectations to sacrifice her own life's values in
order to foster respect for that [other] legal interest."158
V. A COMPARATIVE AND NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT
With respect to the abortion issue, Germany's Federal Con-
stitutional Court has achieved a reconciliation of liberty and
community that could well serve as a model for other constitu-
tional courts, including the United States Supreme Court. Al-
though Germany's substantive law need not be adopted, thought
should be given to the importance of both liberty and commu-
nity as evidenced by Germany's decision.
Not all commentators agree with this evaluation. One com-
parative study of German and American abortion cases con-
cluded: "In striking down stringent statutory restrictions the
United States Supreme Court provided other jurisdictions, in-
cluding Germany, with a salutary lesson in balancing conflicting
fundamental rights in the light of social reality."1 59 This assess-
ment, however, falls wide of the mark. Wade failed to recognize
any right of the unborn child. It certainly did not endeavor to
balance a mother's fundamental rights against the fundamental
value of unborn life as did the Federal Constitutional Court
which crafted a social indications solution to the abortion
problem.
The Wade Court recognized the state's compelling interest
in protecting potential life, but confined this interest to the last
trimester of pregnancy. A compelling societal interest should not
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 43.
158. Id. at 48. The Constitutional Court was actually restoring the "social grounds"
exception that appeared in a bill originally sponsored by a minority of Social Democratic
representatives. See id. at 14.
159. Gerstein & Lowry, supra note 6, at 876.
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be confused with a person's fundamental rights. Whatever con-
sideration the Wade Court might have given to society's interest
in protecting the fetus, that interest-and thus all judicial bal-
ancing efforts-appears to have disappeared in the solvent of
subsequent autonomy jurisprudence.
In any event, comparative legal scholars are naturally curi-
ous to know why two major constitutional tribunals of our time,
committed to liberal values and applying similar constitutional
norms, view the abortion problem through such different lenses.
These lenses are, of course, colored by the language and history
of written constitutions, cultural and legal traditions, and the ju-
dicial background characteristics and political context out of
which abortion cases have arisen. Legal realism and social reality
dictate some attention to these factors, but such factors alone
cannot fully explain why the German tribunal, two years after
Wade, chose a course so divergent from American constitutional
doctrine.
Any search for an explanation of judicial policy may begin
with the original history and text of the Constitution, but it cer-
tainly cannot end there. The text and history of the two consti-
tutions are markedly different, as we have seen. Yet, as the dis-
senting opinions in both the American and German cases show,
one may plausibly envision decisions by both tribunals uphold-
ing the challenged abortion statutes. Legal culture likewise falls
to explain the divergence of these cases, if only because abortion
has been the subject of rigorous statutory regulation in most le-
gal cultures, including those of Germany and the United States.
Indeed, even today, the "liberalized" abortion statutes of several
West European democracies, including the statute struck down
by the Federal Constitutional Court, are far more strict than the
policy enunciated by the Supreme Court in Wade and its
progeny.
Politics and the background traits of justices are equally un-
availing to explain the outcome in the German abortion case. It
may be true, as Gerstein and Lowry assert, that in mounting a
constitutional challenge against an abortion statute supported
by a Social-Free Democratic coalition government, Christian
Democratic representatives were engaging in "manipulation of
the constitutional process rather than a sincere quest for consti-
tutional interpretation."' 60 But a charge of "manipulation" could
160. Id. at 860.
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be brought against petitioners in any case referred to the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court under its abstract judicial review juris-
diction. Such cases are almost always initiated against the gov-
ernment by minority or opposition parties. Once before the
court, however, legitimate questions of constitutional law must
be addressed, whatever the motivation of the responsible
parties.
Gerstein and Lowry also point out that five of the six jus-
tices in the majority were identified with the Christian Demo-
cratic Party while one of the dissenters was a woman.' Some
tension on the court along party lines may have existed, but the
decision cannot be explained in strictly partisan terms. First,
there was no doctrinal disagreement among justices over the
right to life of the fetus at all stages of pregnancy. Rather, the
judicial split was over the proper scope of judicial review.'62 Sec-
ond, the "Christian Democratic majority" authorized Parliament
to permit abortions during the first twelve weeks on social
grounds, a solution originally appearing in a bill introduced by
Social Democrats. 63 The point is this: the reductionism inherent
in the Gerstein-Lowry analysis overlooks the real complexity of
constitutional decision making in the German context, as well as
the significance of troublesome intellectual issues facing the
Constitutional Court in the abortion controversy.
Gerstein and Lowry have also tried to explain the divergent
results reached by the two tribunals by contrasting the "ab-
stract" approach of the Federal Constitutional Court to the "law
in action" approach of the Supreme Court. '6 But such charac-
terizations are also not helpful. One person's realism often turns
out to be another's abstraction. One could easily describe the
trimester rationale underlying Wade as an abstraction, as the
German court pointed out, wholly at odds with "established bio-
logical-physiological findings."' 5
There is, of course, another sense in which the German ap-
proach to constitutional analysis is more abstract than the
American. The Supreme Court decides only cases and controver-
sies within the context of particular fact patterns and in light of
precedent. By contrast, the Federal Constitutional Court is often
161. Id. at 861.
162. Id. at 866.
163. Id. at 856-58.
164. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
165. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG 1, 37.
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more systematic in its approach to legal analysis. Trained in the
civil law tradition, German judges tend naturally to write like
general theorists, a tendency accentuated in abstract judicial re-
view cases where the only issue before the court is the general
validity of a particular statute. Whether abstract or utilitarian
reasoning is good or bad depends on the intrinsic merit of the
argument advanced and upon the validity of the empirical sup-
positions behind the argument. In any event, the two tribunals'
different approaches do not in themselves explain why the two
courts reached such divergent conclusions.
A. Personhood, Liberty, and the Role of Law: Contrasting
Images
The key to better understanding of doctrinal differences be-
tween the German and American courts is more likely to be
found in certain background values underlying the abortion ju-
risprudence of each country. A close reading of this jurispru-
dence reveals significant differences in each tribunal's under-
standing of personhood, liberty, and the role of law.
1. Personhood
As was remarked earlier, the Federal Constitutional Court
construed the Basic Law as a value-oriented constitutional or-
der, with the right to life and the dignity of man constituting its
supreme values. However, Walter Murphy and others have ar-
gued that, as interpreted, the American Constitution also em-
bodies a hierarchy of values.1 6 6 After all, American constitutional
law rings with the rhetoric and language of basic values and fun-
damental rights. Human dignity and personhood are what strict
scrutiny, compelling state interest, and least restrictive means
analyses are all about.
In focusing on abortion cases, however, one finds that the
two courts really mean different things when they speak of
human dignity and personhood. The German court has inter-
preted those terms in a far less individualistic sense than the
United States Supreme Court. In fact, we find in the Basic Law
itself social limits on the development of personality that have
no equivalent in the United States Constitution. Recall that the
166. See Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. Rv. 703
(1980).
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right to free development of one's personality is limited by the
"moral code," the "constitutional order," and the "rights of
others," constraints implicit in the long-abandoned definition of
liberty advanced by Justice McReynolds in Meyer v. Nebraska.
This ensemble of German constitutional values underscores
the social nature of the human person. For example, the Federal
Constitutional Court has written:
The concept of man in the Basic Law is not that of an isolated
sovereign individual; rather the Basic Law has decided in favor
of a relationship between individual and community in the
sense of a person's dependence on and commitment to the
community, without infringing upon a person's individual
value.
167
In saying this the court was not suggesting that autonomy is an
unimportant value in German constitutional law. Indeed, auton-
omy is essential to liberty. But as the Constitutional Court as-
serted in another context, "the Basic Law is based on the image
of man as an autonomous person who develops fully within the
social community." 1 8 Or, as the court noted in a recent case, the
"community-bound" and "community-related" individual, of ne-
cessity, is a social being.16
In American abortion cases, on the other hand, the accent is
on man as an autonomous moral agent, unbounded and un-
bonded-a private being, a totally independent self. The com-
munity may not officially impose itself on a pregnant woman,
just as law is barred from granting husbands or parents overrid-
ing rights with respect to the abortion decision. The ideal society
of the abortion cases is a society of individuals free of tradition.
These individuals constitute the sole basis for resolving issues of
moral significance. The argument here, however, is that the
abortion cases have transformed Justice McReynolds' notion of
fourteenth amendment liberty into an ideology of unfettered
free choice.
2. Liberty
When discussing liberty, our attention shifts mainly to the
American cases. As just noted, liberty under the aegis of the Su-
167. Judgment of July 7, 1970, BVerfG, W. Ger., 30 BVerfG 1, 20.
168. Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, BVerfG, W. Ger., 30 BVerfG 173, 193.
169. See Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, BVerfG, W. Ger., reprinted in 5 Hum. RTs. L.J.
94, 101 (1984).
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preme Court has evolved into an ideology of free choice, one
that seriously undermines community and sociality in American
constitutional thought. In matters of abortion and contraception
at least, choice cannot lawfully be limited in the absence of a
compelling state reason. The state may not interfere with the
character of sexuality or how it is manifested. Why? Because in
this area of personal relationships, as in many others, law cannot
deal with matters of value. A compelling public interest test usu-
ally requires the state to produce some kind of cost-benefit anal-
ysis showing beyond doubt that the social benefits of regulation
substantially outweigh social costs. Values, tradition, religion, lo-
calism, or ideas of "the good" drawn from normative political
philosophy do not measurably affect analysis.
It is interesting to note the extent to which this notion of
liberty coincides with perhaps the most influential intellectual
current in contemporary constitutional theory. That current is
reflected in the rights-oriented constitutionalism of scholars like
R.S. Dworkin, David Richards, Rogers Smith, and Michael
Perry.170 These scholars, and others, have labored tirelessly to
develop theories of human rights based on rational principles of
order and universalistic standards of judgment. These theories,
rooted in contemporary moral philosophy and heavily Kantian
in orientation, are based on a cold rationality that prescinds all
human feeling and personal identities. Thus, these theories tran-
scend all the subjectivities which give us our character as per-
sons. Because these subjectivities-commitments, values, fami-
lies, communities, customs, religions, and habits-are by
definition value laden, they are deemed irrational and hence
cannot contribute to public policy. The new constitutionalism of
the rights theorists would reduce these subjectivities to irrele-
vance in order that we may experience, in the new constitutional
republic of the late twentieth century, a newfound human dig-
nity supported and reinforced by the moral neutrality of ration-
alistic jurisprudence. 71 1 In any case, under the new constitution-
alism of these scholars, as well as in the Supreme Court's
abortion jurisprudence, autonomy as freedom of choice assumes
the character of an architectonic principle under which liberty
170. See R.S. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); M PERRY, supra note 22;
D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); R. SMITH, LBERALISM AND THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (1985).
171. See Kommers, The Supreme Court and the Constitution: The Continuing De-
bate on Judicial Review, 47 REv. POL. 113 (1985).
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and freedom are to be understood. Liberty takes priority over
duty, over fraternity, and over community.
3. The Role of Law
Clearly, there is a vast difference in the two tribunals' atti-
tudes toward the appropriate role of law. The objective value
order of the Basic Law and the positive concept of rights
gleaned from it by the Constitutional Court means that even in
the order of personal morality, law has an important and neces-
sary role. In what may appear to many as a conservative and
paternalistic decree, the German court ruled that in light of the
supreme value of life specified by the Basic Law, the legislature
is obligated to express its disapproval of abortion as a general
principle. Thus, in German constitutional polity, law plays a
crucial educative role. By contrast, in the United States, law
must remain morally neutral if free choice is to be given reign.
B. A New Synthesis of Liberty and Community in American
Law
In assessing the comparative significance of German and
American abortion jurisprudence, one must consider some reali-
ties. The United States is not a Sozialstaat. When Justice
Thurgood Marshall spoke of the moral bankruptcy of certain
anti-abortionists in the Medicaid cases, he was mindful of the
plight of women driven to abortion by the absence of social help
or economic aid.17 2 But others have shown that the abortion
agenda was created not by persons or organizations representing
the poor, but by the medical profession, middle-class feminists,
and allies in the judicial establishment unconcerned with values
of commitment and responsibility in personal relations.17 3
This class-based analysis has been argued even more co-
gently by Robert Rodes. He argues in a seminal essay that the
Supreme Court's liberty jurisprudence corresponds perfectly
with interests of the professional and cultural elite who set the
tone of American society. 7 4 Persons benefiting most from this
jurisprudence are those "geographically homogeneous and cul-
turally eclectic" Americans "comfortable without the family,
172. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 346 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
173. This thesis is argued persuasively in NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE (1979).
174. Rodes, Greatness Thrust Upon Them-Class Bases in American Law, 28 AA.
J. JURIS. 1 (1983).
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neighborhood, and subcultural ties on which other Americans
depend.11 75 By the same token, persons benefiting most from the
erosion of sexual standards are those "who are better able to de-
rive satisfaction from organizational and technical accomplish-
ments than from personal relations, middle-aged men who can
afford to trade their wives in on expensive new models, and
young people who have never had occasion to learn about de-
ferred gratification." 17 6 This is the class on whose behalf the Su-
preme Court speaks in the abortion cases, supporting a public
world of ideological neutrality, a world in which law has no role
in personal morality, in short, effectively creating a world in
which law cannot prefer chastity over prostitution.
Most Americans, however, do not live in this world. Rather,
they live in settings enlivened and enriched by tradition, family,
neighborhood, and other subjectivities. These subjectivities,
which law need not ignore or suppress, are part of our objective
existence as persons. A decent respect for the pluralistic nature
of American society would seem to demand not a one-world view
of social morality, but rather an accommodation of competing
views of the public good.
This is not to suggest that West Germany's constitutional
policy on abortion could or should be adopted in the United
States. However, what the German jurisprudence gives us is a
richer concept of the human personality. The moral rationality
underlying American cases "abstracts persons from the mean-
ingful contexts in which they live their lives and define them-
selves. 1 77 In fact, obsessive concern with freedom of choice may
damage personality and character, actually inhibiting people
from resolving their problems in accordance with their
identities.
The abortion liberty vindicated by the Supreme Court has
deprived the community of the means to make meaningful and
effective choices. Why not allow a state to enact laws designed to
encourage a woman to consider the significance of pregnancy
and childbirth, and to reflect on the meaning of these events in
the life of persons and the community? As the most recent
round of abortion cases demonstrates, the Supreme Court seems
determined to strike down any and every law crafted to enhance
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 4.
177. See Kommers, supra note 171, at 124.
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the quality of moral rationality or to encourage exercise of moral
choice within a framework of familial, communal, or social
relationships.
Our current constitutional policy, so different from that of
Germany, arguably drives women into isolation, leaving them to
their own devices. The Supreme Court considers requirements
like waiting periods, counseling, and instructions mandating a
physician to inform a woman about fetal development unduly
burdensome and violative of the right to privacy. Yet these de-
vices have been upheld by European constitutional courts as
reasonable abortion regulations."1 8 And if they are deemed to be
reasonable by the high constitutional tribunals of Western Eu-
rope, by what standard should they be deemed unreasonable or
unduly burdensome in the United States? After all, many states
have statutes requiring counseling in divorce cases. In a few of
these states, if one party desires counseling, the other can even
be forced to participate.1 7 9
Constitutional law would actually be truer to the human
condition if it allowed friendship and fraternity to play a role in
the abortion context before seeking to impose some spacious and
abstract freedom of choice in the name of privacy. In truth, the
values of equal concern and respect for persons would seem to
demand nothing less than consideration of the background,
identities, and affiliations of women caught up in the abortion
predicament.
None of this is to suggest that abortion should be banned
altogether, or that law should punish sins of the flesh as it once
tried to do, or that the police should monitor what occurs in the
privacy of the home. But law can teach and encourage commit-
ment to certain kinds of values treasured by society and tradi-
tion. What is troublesome about American constitutional policy
is that it gives tremendous support to certain kinds or classes of
people, but hardly any support-community support-to those
persons who have chosen other values. A constitutional policy
may require law to permit abortion, yet not encourage commer-
cialization of abortion, trivialization of sex and family, or an ide-
178. See supra note 2.
179. For representative statutes, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1730-1772 (Deering
1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-8 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.16
(West 1981 & Supp. 1985); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 7-102 (1984); N.Y. FAhL CT. LAW
§§ 911-926 (McKinney 1983).
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ology of choice whose own educative effect on the rest of society
is corrosive and destructive of values cherished by the majority.
Finally, the comparative perspective allows us to get a bet-
ter grip on the issue of the fetus' humanity. Recall that after
examining various senses in which the term "person" is used in
the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded
that the unborn child was not a person within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment. The German tribunal, by contrast,
felt no need to examine the personhood of the unborn child. In-
deed, the court studiously avoided using the term "person"
when referring to the unborn. Instead, the court employed ter-
minology such as "prenatal life," "developmental existence,"
"preliminary phase of human life," and "life developing in the
womb. ' '18 In describing the unborn child as an "independent
human being," the court did so in a biological, not an anthropo-
logical or psychological sense. The court declined to decide
whether the unborn child was itself a bearer of rights, and even
refrained from designating the newborn child as a human person
since the newly born do not experience "the phenomenon of
consciousness specific to human personality."'1 81 Rather, the un-
born child is described as an "independent legal interest" which
the state is obligated to protect, not because it is a person, but
because it is "developing human life."' 82 The Federal Constitu-
tional Court's argument seems based on the supposition that a
law permitting abortion on demand would diminish the value of
life generally. Potential life is potential life, the court seems to
say, and it is no less potential at three or four months of preg-
nancy than in the last trimester. Thus the state may not cut into
pregnancy at any given stage and say that now the fetus is wor-
thy of protection but that earlier it was not.
The legislative policies upheld by constitutional courts of
other countries are also of interest. In every case except Austria,
unborn human life was deemed worthy of state protection, and
the state interest increases with the biological development of
the fetus. Even in Austria, which recognized no right to life in
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, abortions are permitted af-
ter the first trimester only in the presence of medical or eugenic
indications. 8 3 As the German court indicated, fetal life is linked
180. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, W. Ger., 39 BVerfG 1, 36-42.
181. Id. at 41.
182. Id.
183. See M. Nijsten, supra note 2.
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to complete human life. The latter is not possible without the
former. "Existence which satisfies such a biological definition of
human life should, it is felt, therefore represent an interest wor-
thy of some protection by the legal system."184
One may question the logic of distinguishing between differ-
ent stages of embryonic life. Justice O'Connor recognized this
problem in her assertion that Wade is on a collision course with
itself. So it is interesting that the Canadian, French, Italian, and
German courts recognized the legitimate interest of the state in
protecting the fetus in all stages of pregnancy. And while the
Austrian and Italian courts rejected the contention that the
abortion statutes before them violated the European Convention
on Human Rights, it is noteworthy that the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights sustained the validity of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court's decision under the convention.185
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has considered different perspectives on liberty
and community in German and American constitutional law. In
the abortion context these differences are likely exaggerated.
Had this article focused on German and American free speech
doctrine, differing perspectives on liberty and community, al-
though significant, would have been less sharply drawn. Even in
the abortion context, countervailing currents of thought are be-
ginning to run through American cases, evidenced particularly
by the Medicaid cases and dissenting opinions of the 1983 abor-
tion decisions. Just as one may point historically to strong com-
munitarian perspectives underlying American federal and state
constitutions, there was a time in both American history and law
when liberty and community were regarded as complementary.
Our constitutional law in recent years, however, has subordi-
nated community to liberty. What is needed now is a new syn-
thesis between liberty and community, a synthesis that the com-
parative perspective may help accomplish.
184. Glenn, The Constitutional Validity of Abortion Legislation: A Comparative
Note, 21 McGILL L.J. 673, 684 (1975).
185. See Briiggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1976 Y.B. EuR.
CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 382 (Eur. Comm'n. on Human Rights).
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